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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to verify whether and to which extent co-movements in EU 
banks’ risk, i.e. their degree of exposures of European banks to common shocks, have 
increased in time, following the completion of Monetary Union, the introduction of 
the euro and the process of European banking integration. To this end, we provide a 
measure of co-movements in bank risk by means of a dynamic factor model, which 
allows to decompose an indicator of bank fragility, the Distance-to-Default, into three 
main components: an EU-wide, a country-specific and a bank-level idiosyncratic 
component. Our results show the commonality in bank risk appears to have 
significantly increased since 1999, in particular if one concentrates on large banks. 
We also show that co-movements in EU banks’ fragility are only in part related to 
common macro shocks and that a banking system specific component at the EU-wide 
level appears relevant. This has obvious consequences in terms of systemic stability, 
but may also have far reaching policy implications with regards to the structuring of 
banking supervision in Europe. 
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Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse co-movements in the fragility of EU-15 banks, and 
verify to which extent such co-movements have increased in time, following, the 
completion of Monetary Union, the introduction of the euro and the process of 
European banking integration. 
 
Essentially, co-movements in bank risk derive from the exposure to common shocks, 
which may come from different sources. They may be related to common 
macroeconomic shocks, but they may also stem from common exposures to 
industries, countries, or individual counterparts, as well as from interbank linkages 
(see Upper and Worms 2002, Gropp and Vesala 2004). 
 
There are several reasons to believe that common shocks affecting EU banks may 
have increased. Firstly, as regards common macro shocks at EU wide level, there 
seems to be sufficient evidence showing their relevance. Forni and Reichlin (2001), 
among others, show that the variance in output growth displayed by individual EU 
countries is largely explained by a European component. Secondly, as the process of 
banking and financial integration in Europe has progressed also bank linkages have 
risen. Hence, while retail banking has remained a largely domestic business, there has 
been a considerable growth in a number of segments that may have increased the 
sources of common shocks to which EU banks are exposed. Think for example to 
cross-border interbank exposures, which in the euro area have significantly increased 
since 1998 (Hartmann et. al. 2003, Galati et. al. 2001). To give an idea of such 
growth, note that as of December 2005, euro area MFIs’ cross-border interbank loans 
in the EU were 40% of total interbank loans up from 26% at the end of 1997. Another 
example is represented by euro area MFIs’ cross-border securities holdings, whose 
growth has been even much higher and whose share on the total more than doubled 
since 1999 (from less than 40% at the end of 1998 to 84% at the end of 2005). But 
one could also mention the growth in other segments of business, e.g. syndicated 
loans, derivatives and country exposures, which may increase the degree of 
commonality in banks’ risk. 
 
Clearly, a growth in co-movements in banks fragility has consequences in terms of 
systemic stability, since it increases the likelihood of widespread banking crises. 
Indeed, as argued by De Nicolò and Tieman (2005), Stiroh (2004) and Stiroh and 
Rumble (2005) among the others, financial integration may enhance diversification 
opportunities thereby improving banks’ risk profile. However, this could be true only 
for individual intermediaries, while the system as a whole may actually become less 
diversified if its exposure to the same sources of risk increases. This has far reaching 
policy implications as regards the lender of last resort function in the EU single 
financial market (Schinasi and Teixeira 2006), but it may have also important 
implications for the structuring of banking supervision in Europe, e.g. the split of 
supervisory competencies between national and supranational or pan-European 
authorities. Indeed, finding robust evidence of growing linkages between the fragility 
of banks located in different national jurisdictions increases the extent of cross-border 
externalities which is a typical argument in favour of a supervisory authority at a EU 
level (Schoenmaker and Osterloo 2005). Certainly, such an outcome would increase 
the scope for supervisory co-operation among domestic authorities. This would be 
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especially true if such interconnectedness are related not only to common 
macroeconomic shocks but also to growing EU-wide banking system specific factors. 
 
Against this backdrop, we provide a measure of co-movements in bank risk by means 
of a dynamic factor model (Stock and Watson 1999 and Forni, Hallin, Lippi, Reichlin 
2000, 2002), which allows to decompose an indicator of bank fragility, the Distance-
to-Default (DD) (Gropp et. al. 2004 and 2006), into three main components: an EU-
wide, a country-specific and a bank-level idiosyncratic component. 
 
In addition, we measure the influence of common macroeconomic shocks at EU and 
country level on our fragility indicator. By removing the effects of such common 
macro shock we identify a banking sector specific source of fragility which is in turn 
decomposed into the three components specified above. 
 
A further contribution of our paper is that, analysing the data in the frequency domain, 
we are able to distinguish between short-term, cyclical and long-term co-movements 
in bank fragility. Whereas the former might be related to large shocks or, eventually, 
some sort of contagion, the latter might be associated to common cyclical shocks or 
the fact that banking sectors are becoming increasingly similar (or integrated). 
 
While the idea of co-movements in economic and financial variables is not new in 
economic literature (see Sargent and Sims 1977) and has recently gained renewed 
interest, to our knowledge applications to the banking sector are more limited. Indeed, 
the most recent work has been devoted to measuring co-movements in economic 
variables, like GDP or inflation, in the context of the business cycle analysis, but there 
is also vast literature regarding co-movements in financial variables (see for instance, 
among others, Fama and French (1993), Emiris (2002)). 
 
Hawkesby, Marsh and Stevens (2003 and 2005) provide an application to the banking 
sector. These authors analyse co-movements in equity returns for a set of US and 
European Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFI) by using several statistical 
techniques amongst which a static factor model. They find a high degree of 
commonality between asset price developments of most LCFIs. However, their results 
also show that there is still significant heterogeneity between sub-groups of LCFIs, 
e.g. according to geography. Increased interconnectedness among banks is also found 
by De Nicolò and Kwast (2002), who notice a significant rise in stock price 
correlation for a set of large US banks, which they partly attribute to consolidation in 
the financial sector. Increased exposures of financial institutions to common shocks is 
also found in a recent contribution by De Nicolò and Tieman (2005), which is very 
close to our paper, as it is based on the same risk measure of risk, the Distance-to-
Default (albeit applying a different methodology in gauging the degree of 
commonality in financial intermediaries’ risk). The authors, focusing on a set of large 
European banks and insurance companies, look at the dynamics of the risk profiles of 
these institutions and analyse their sensitiveness to common shocks in real activity 
and to a measure of financial integration. They find that the risk profiles of these 
intermediaries have converged during the past 15 years, and that this convergence is 
to a large extent related to increased synchronisation in real economic activity among 
European countries, which offsets the diversification benefits coming from financial 
integration.  
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The analysis of co-movements in risk is also quite connected to credit risk’s portfolio 
analysis. In both cases, in fact, the focus is on default correlations. Within this 
context, Nickell and Perraudin (1999), for UK banks, and Lehar (2003), for a sample 
of international banks, examine bank fragility on a portfolio perspective. To this end, 
they derive banks’ default probabilities from observable market data based on the 
option pricing theory (similarly to us), and calculate the risk of simultaneous 
weakness in several banks by considering asset return correlations.  
 
Our approach is different from that followed in the papers mentioned above, since we 
consider the propagation mechanism of common shocks, which, ultimately, are the 
sources of asset and default correlation. In other words, this means that different 
banks may be hit by the same shock but with different time delays (and leads), which 
allows for bank-level heterogeneity. Indeed, this is one of the main advantages of 
using a dynamic factor model, which enables exploiting much more information than, 
for instance, a static factor model. In addition, we are able to measure the relative 
contribution of EU-wide, domestic and idiosyncratic shocks to bank risk, which is the 
main focus of this paper. 
 
Our results highlight the fact that co-movements in bank fragility are not negligible at 
EU-wide level. Further, the commonality in bank risk appears significantly increasing 
since 1999 and that such rise is largely related to the increased relevance of a EU 
banking system specific component rather than common macroeconomic shocks. 
Moreover, by analysing co-movements in the frequency domain, we find out that 
common EU-wide shocks are more relevant at cyclical and/or long-term frequencies, 
which is in line with the increasing integration in the EU banking system (Cabral et. 
al. (2002)). However, we notice that co-movements at very high frequencies (i.e. in 
the very short term) are relevant when one concentrates on large banks, which is 
consistent with some recent results on bank contagion in Europe (Gropp and Vesala, 
2004). 
 
The paper is structured as follows. We start by describing the methodology 
underlying our fragility indicator and the data used. We then perform some basic 
descriptive analyses in order to provide a first rough evidence of how EU banks 
fragility is interconnected. These descriptive analyses constitute the premises for our 
dynamic factor model whose description and results are reported in section 3. In 
section 4 we assess the role of common macroeconomic shocks at national and EU-
wide level in explaining the dynamics of banks’ fragility. Section 5 concludes and 
outlines possible lines for future research. 
 
 
1 The fragility indicator and the data 
 
The fragility indicator 
 
We use the distance to default (DD) as an indicator of bank fragility. The DD is a 
Merton-based (i.e. option pricing) indicator derived from the Black and Scholes 
formula (see KMV Corporation 2001).  
More specifically, assuming that the market value of a firm’s assets follows a 
stochastic process of the type: 
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which expresses the time path of the asset value given its current value ( AV ) and a 
stochastic disturbance normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance 
( )1,0(N≈ε ). 
 
From this, indicating with D  the value of the firm’s liabilities, we can define the 
distance from the default point as follows: 
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This yields the formula for the Distance-to-default, which is defined as the number of 
standard deviations that a firm is from the default point. 
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We decided to use the DD as fragility indicator since it represents a measure of bank 
risk with some desirable properties. In particular, Gropp et al. (2006 and 2006) show 
that this indicator encompasses most elements of bank risk (asset returns, volatility - 
i.e. asset risk - and leverage) and constitutes a measure not affected by the presence of 
explicit or implicit safety nets. Further, this indicator, being based on stock market 
information, is inherently forward-looking and available more frequently than 
traditional balance-sheet indicators (in principle, it can be calculated on a real-time 
basis). More importantly, the authors show that this measure is more capable than 
other market indicators of bank fragility (e.g. subordinated bond spread, or stock 
returns) to predict a material deterioration in bank’s condition (up to 18 months in 
advance). Hence, the DD may represent a useful indicator to monitor bank fragility 
that may complement the information provided by other sources (e.g. balance sheets). 
However the same authors also highlight some limitations of the DD indicator. In 
particular, the distance to default can be sensitive to trading irregularities which could 
be particularly high for banks with low trading volumes (typically small banks or 
banks in a troubled situation). In the context of this paper this could mean biasing our 
results towards not finding evidence of co-movements in the fragility of EU banks. 
 
It follows from the formula that the basic ingredients for the calculation of the DD are 
AV  and Aσ . They can be calculated from observable market value of equity, EV , 
equity volatility, Eσ , and the value of liabilities D , by solving the following system 
of two equations: 
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We solved the system of two equations by using the generalised gradient method to 
yield the values for AV  and Aσ . As observable market value of equity, EV , we 
employed the end of week equity market capitalisation from Thomson Financial 
Datastream. The equity volatility, Eσ , was estimated by taking the standard deviation 
of weekly equity returns in a rolling one-year window (i.e. 52 weeks). The total 
liabilities, D , are obtained from the banks published accounts, and as risk free rates 
we used the interest rates on the one year asset swap. Finally, the maturity of the debt, 
T, was set to one year, which is a common benchmark assumption without any 
specific information about the maturity structure of the debt. 
 
Once obtained the DDs for each bank in the sample, we calculated their log first 
difference, )ln( DD∆  at weekly and monthly frequencies1, in order to partly reduce the 
noise (which is especially high in financial markets data) that may affect weekly 
changes but also to better distinguish the short-term from the cyclical and long-term 
components of co-movements in bank risk. 
 
The sample of banks 
 
The initial sample of banks considered in the paper is represented by 160 listed banks 
for which stock market data (stock price and market capitalisation) and debt are 
available during the period from November 1994 to December 2004. 
 
We estimated the dynamic factor model by using a balanced panel. Hence, we had to 
delete a number of banks for which data were not available for the whole sample 
period. We ended-up with a sample of 99 banks incorporated in EU-15 countries (new 
accessed EU countries are not represented), with 529 weekly observations per bank. 
The list of banks with their total assets and country of incorporation is reported in 
Table 1. 
 
The banks in the sample are relatively large (the average asset size amounts to slightly 
more than EUR 100 bln), but there is also a substantial presence of small-mid sized 
banks. Note on this regard that the median size equals EUR 25 bln euro. The largest 
bank in the sample is Deutsche Bank (end 2002 total assets of about EUR 760 bln), 
                                                 
1  The monthly DDs are obtained as a simple average of the weekly. 
 7
while the smallest is Union Financière de France Banque with only EUR 186 mln of 
total assets. 
 
The distribution of the banks by country highlights the relatively high presence of 
Italian banks (19 banks), while some large countries are relatively underrepresented 
(there are only 8 French and UK banks). The reduced size of the sample for some 
countries may constitute a problem when estimating the country component of bank 
fragility. However, given the approach followed in the paper in estimating the 
dynamic factor model (i.e. the procedure suggested by Stock and Watson (1999)), the 
fact of having a large T should preserve the significance of our results (at least as far 
as the EU-wide component is concerned).2 Moreover, since our main interest relies in 
the estimate of the relevance of the EU-wide component, the fact that the 
measurement of the national component might be distorted by small sample size 
problems should not constitute a major issue. Nevertheless, this caveat should be 
borne in mind when interpreting the results obtained in the paper. 
 
 
2 Preliminary descriptive analyses 
 
In order to provide a first rough evidence of co-movements in bank fragility we 
conducted a set of preliminary descriptive analyses, as basic premises to our dynamic 
factor model.  
 
Contemporaneous correlation analyses 
 
We first looked at the contemporaneous correlation in the weekly and monthly 
changes in banks’ DDs. We considered the monthly changes in order to partly reduce 
the noise (which is especially high in financial markets data) that may affect weekly 
changes. The correlations were calculated for the sample of 99 banks considering the 
entire period, and the periods before and after 1 January 1999 in order to check 
whether in correspondence with the start of the EMU there has been a rise in the 
degree of co-movements between the fragility of EU banks. Of course the choice of 
the break-point in the sample is purely arbitrarily, but without any further reference as 
to where fix it, the EMU starting date becomes a quite natural candidate. It is also 
clear that finding an increase in correlations between the two sub-periods does not 
necessarily mean that it has been “caused” by the EMU process. Nevertheless, such a 
correspondence would certainly be of some interest, e.g. for research purposes (and 
not only). Results are summarised in Table 2. 
 
In general, correlations in bank risk appear rather low on average (6 % for weekly 
changes, up to 14 % in the case of monthly changes). Distinguishing between 
correlations among banks belonging to the same country (domestic correlation), and 
correlations among banks from other countries (cross-border correlation), it appears 
that the average domestic correlation, albeit still remaining low, is dominant over the 
cross-border one: while the average domestic correlation stands at 14% (23% for the 
monthly changes), the cross-border one equals only 5% (12% for monthly changes). 
Note, however, that the distinction made is not appropriate because part of what has 
                                                 
2  Stock and Watson (1999, theorem 1 at pag. 11) show that the approximate dynamic factor 
model yields estimated factors that are asymptotically efficient in forecasting out of sample for any 
joint sequences (N,T)Æ ∞. 
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been labelled domestic correlation may be due to EU-wide shocks. This is one of the 
reasons why a factor model is particularly useful, since it yields components of banks’ 
fragility which are mutually orthogonal. 
 
Splitting the sample in the two sub-periods there seems to be a slight increase in 
average pairwise correlations: taking the weekly changes the average correlation 
equals 4% in the period before 1999 while it goes up to 8%. A similar finding is 
obtained with the monthly changes. 
 
Nonetheless, these results are not surprising as small and mid sized banks are largely 
affected by developments in their country of incorporation or by idiosyncratic shocks. 
Further, as it will be shown in the next section, contemporaneous correlations may not 
fully capture the transmission of shocks between banks. 
 
We moved then to look at the correlation in bank fragility among a set of large banks, 
defined somewhat arbitrarily as those with total assets as of end 2002 above 100 bln 
euro (28 banks belonging to 9 EU countries).  
In this case, the average correlations appear significantly larger both considering the 
weekly (17%) and the monthly changes (35%): in both cases they are, in fact, above 
the standard threshold 
T
2±  (where T is the number of observations) denoting 
statistically significant correlations. Further there seems to be a material increase in 
the average correlation in the post 1999 period: taking the weekly changes, the mean 
correlation goes up to 24% from 10% in the first part of the sample. It is worth noting 
that the observed increase is largely owing to cross-border correlations which rise to 
23% in the post 1999 period from 8% in the first sub sample.  
 
Correlations increase significantly between the two sub-periods also when the 
monthly changes are considered (from 21% to 42%). Even in this case the rise can be 
noticeably attributed to cross-border correlations (41% in the post 1999 period from 
19% in the earlier part of the sample). 
 
Looking at average correlations, though, may not fully reveal the degree of 
commonality in bank risk among EU banks. Indeed there could be large pairwise 
correlations which are then offset by low or even negative correlations. For the 
analysis of co-movements in bank fragility (and for financial stability purposes) might 
thus be relevant considering the distribution of such pairwise correlations. One can, in 
fact, think of that even relatively few large correlations between the riskness of banks 
incorporated in different countries might be sufficient for having significant cross-
border co-movements in bank fragility. Charts 1-4 report the frequency distribution of 
pairwise correlations between the changes in banks’ DDs in the two sample-periods 
distinguishing among domestic and cross-border correlations as specified above. The 
charts reinforce the finding previously highlighted of strengthened interconnectedness 
in the riskness of EU banks. For example, taking the weekly changes (Charts 1 and 2) 
we do observe a large increase in the number of statistically significant pairwise 
positive correlations (namely greater than 
T
2 ): the number of such significant 
correlations stands at 1,516 out of 4,851 (i.e. 99*98/2) in the post-1999 period versus 
646 in the ante-1999 sample. Adopting a criterion of economic significance, e.g. 
considering correlations greater or equal than 50% (which are, indeed, very large 
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when if one takes DDs weekly changes), we obtain a similar outcome: the number of 
economically significant correlations increases from 7 in the 1995-’98 time interval to 
48 in the 1999-’04 period. Again, we do find a large increase in the number of 
statistically and economically significant correlations at the cross-border level. The 
frequency distribution of correlations on monthly DD changes (Charts 3 and 4) tells a 
pretty similar story. 
 
To sum up, the results of the correlation analysis in DDs changes provides a first 
evidence of the fact that co-movements in bank fragility at EU-wide level are not 
negligible, especially when one concentrates on large banks. In addition, the 
commonality in bank risk appears significantly increasing since 1999 even at the 
cross-border level. 
 
Correlations at leads and lags  
 
As a second step we looked at correlations at several leads and lags. This constitutes 
the basic premises for the dynamic factor model developed in the following section. 
Indeed, one motivation for the use of a dynamic factor model instead of a static one is 
the fact that common shocks are not only contemporaneous, but that there exists a 
propagation mechanism of such shocks which follows a more complex dynamics, 
which implies the existence of first or higher order auto-correlations and cross-
correlations. In addition, this enables to take into account the heterogeneity among 
banks in the propagation of common shocks. 
 
As before, it is perhaps more interesting to focus on the distributions of the computed 
pairwise correlations at several leads and lags in weekly and monthly DD changes 
(we considered 8 leads and lags for the weekly changes and 3 leads and lags for the 
monthly). Table 3 reports the count of the statistically and economically  significant 
correlations3. It shows that the number of such correlations is material suggesting that 
including leads and lags changes in the factor model may increase its explicative 
power. Taking for example the lag 1 for the weekly DD changes we find 953 
statistically significant positive correlations, around 20% of the total pairwise 
correlations. Further around 80% of these correlations (i.e. 761) are among banks 
incorporated in different EU countries. Indeed, considering leads and lags in the DD 
changes appears relevant to highlight the transmission of common shocks at the cross 
border level especially between large and mid sized banks. To illustrate we report, as 
an example, the cross-correlations between a large Italian bank (Capitalia) and a 
medium size Spanish bank (Banca Pastor): Chart 5 shows that correlations at lags 1 
and 2 in the weekly DD changes are significantly higher than the contemporaneous 
one (equalling respectively 44% and 25% versus 17%). 
 
Dynamic correlations and cohesion 
 
Further interesting insights may come from the analysis of dynamic correlations and 
cohesion which represent two measures of correlation in the frequency domain 
                                                 
3  Statistically significant correlations are those above or below the threshold 
T
2± . 
Economically significant correlations are defined as those greater than 30% or 50% for the weekly and 
monthly changes respectively. 
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proposed by Croux, Forni and Reichlin (2001). Essentially, these measures highlight 
the frequencies at which cross-correlations between variables are more relevant. Thus, 
they help in saying whether co-movements are related to common short-term 
dynamics or if they reflect common cyclical shocks or more long-term tendencies. 
 
Taking two zero-mean real stochastic processes x  and y , the dynamic correlation 
can be defined as follows: 
 
)()(
)(
)( λλ
λλρ
yx
xy
xy SS
C
⋅=  
 
where )(λxS  and )(λyS , for πλπ ≤≤− , are the spectral density functions of x  and 
y , and )(λxyC  is the co-spectrum. 
 
Along the same line, the cohesion is a synthetic measure of dynamic correlation when 
there are more than 2 variables. It simply equals the weighted average of dynamic 
correlations between all pairs of series. 
 
In our case, we calculated these measures by using a Bartlett kernel with window 
width at T1/2. Spectra, cross spectra, dynamic correlations and cohesion have then been 
computed on 128 equally spaced points4. 
 
In Charts 6 we report the cohesion on weekly changes, for the two sub-periods 1995-
1998 and 1999-20045. These charts clearly show the increase in co-movements 
between the two periods. In addition, we notice that co-movements are concentrated 
mainly at low frequencies: i.e. bank risk co-moves in the long-term or at cyclical 
frequencies. 
 
Finally, we ran the exercise for the sample of 28 large banks (Chart 7). The results 
highlight the larger commonality among this set of banks found in the simple 
correlation analysis. For this set of banks we also notice a spike in the cohesion 
calculated on weekly DD changes at a frequency corresponding to a period of two 
weeks. This results also highlights the difference between the weekly and the monthly 
DD changes: while weekly DD changes tend to stress co-movements on a very short-
term basis, the monthly changes appear more suitable to reflect co-movements related 
to common cyclical shocks or stemming from common long term tendencies. 
 
To sum up, the analysis on cohesion tends to suggest that cyclical and long-term co-
movements in bank risk are more relevant than those at very short-term frequencies 
(i.e. high frequencies), which is coherent with the increasing integration in the EU 
                                                 
4  We used the Matlab code provided by Croux, Forni and Reichlin, which is available in the 
web site www.dynfactor.com. All the other programmes and routines were prepared by the authors. 
5  The charts report the cohesion for frequencies ranging from 0 (low frequencies corresponding 
to medium to long term cycles) to 3.14 (high frequencies corresponding to very short dynamics). This 
means that with weekly data having for example 210 observations a frequency of 1.55 corresponds to a 
cycle of approximately 4 weeks. 
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banking system (Cabral et. al. (2002)).6 There is also some evidence of co-movements 
in the very short-term for large banks. This seems to suggest that in case of common 
shocks large banks are hit first. Perhaps more importantly, this result could also be 
indicative of some form of contagion hitting large banks, whose source might be 
worth of investigation in future research. 
 
 
3 The dynamic factor model 
 
Model description and estimation procedure 
 
Our basic assumption is that the bank fragility indicator (DD) can be decomposed into 
three main components: an EU-wide, a country-specific and a bank-specific (i.e. 
idiosyncratic) component. These three components are, by definition, mutually 
orthogonal. 
 
Following Forni and Reichlin (2001) and denoting with ijtDD  the Distance-to-Default 
of bank i incorporated in country j, we assume that the changes in the DDs can be 
decomposed as follows 
 
ij
t
ij
t
ij
t
ij
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where ijtE , 
ij
tN , 
ij
tI  are the EU-wide component, the national component and the 
bank-level component respectively. Each component can, in turn, be written as linear 
combination of unit variance shocks, which are uncorrelated at all leads and lags. 
Thus, 
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where ija , ijb  ijc are polynomials in the lag operator L, while te , 
j
tn  and 
ij
ti  are the 
EU-wide, the national and the bank specific shocks respectively. 
 
In order to better clarify the model it is important to underline that those we have 
labelled EU-wide shocks refer to shocks that hit all the banks in the sample 
irrespective from the origin of the shock. Hence, they could be global shocks, but they 
may well be domestic (or even bank-specific) shocks that then propagate to banks 
                                                 
6  These results are also confirmed by a spectral analysis of the three components extracted with 
the dynamic factor model. We do observe, in particular, that in the short-term (high frequencies), the 
idiosyncratic component tends to dominate over the other two, while in the long-run the EU-wide 
component starts to become relevant. For the period 1999-2003, there is also the emergence of a EU-
wide factor at cyclical frequencies. In particular, the charts noticeably suggest a cycle of slightly more 
than two years  that can be associated to the industrial cycle in EU countries in the last years. Further, 
the presence of a national cycle at 4 months frequency in the first sub-sample seems to have been 
absorbed by the EU component in the second period. 
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incorporated in other countries. In other words, what we are interested in is the 
propagation mechanism of shocks to bank fragility rather than where they originate. 
 
The model entails the estimation of the three unobserved components, which is done 
through a sequential procedure. More specifically, the EU-wide component is first 
estimated by means of an approximate dynamic factor model à-la Stock and Watson7 
(1999) applied to all banks in the sample, which can be written as follows (in matrix 
notation): 
 
ttt FDD ε+Λ=∆ )(  
 
The matrix Λ contains the loadings, )....,,( 1 qtttt fffF ±±= is the matrix of common 
factors, while εt is the matrix of residuals, which in the first step of the procedure is a 
bundle of the national and idiosyncratic components (i.e. everything which is not 
common at the EU-wide level). The national component is, in turn, isolated from the 
idiosyncratic one by running the dynamic factor model on these extracted residuals 
for groups of banks incorporated in the same country. 
 
As noted, while the estimation of the EU common factor should not constitute a major 
problem, the size of the sample (i.e. the number of cross-sections/banks) for some 
countries might not be sufficient to consistently estimate the country component of 
bank fragility. However, given that the focus of this paper is in measuring the weight 
of the EU component this should not constitute a major issue. 
 
Once the three components have been estimated and given their orthogonality, the 
decomposition enables to calculate the contribution of each component to the variance 
of the DD changes. 
 
As regards, in particular, the estimation of the dynamic factor model employed in the 
paper, it requires a number of choices to be made. The first is the number of factors to 
be used in estimation, the second is the potential inclusion of lags in the observed 
series, and the third is the inclusion of leads and lags of the factors in the estimation of 
the common components. 
 
While the first can be made on the basis of the modified information criteria proposed 
in Bai-Ng (2002), the second and the third have been performed by Stock and Watson 
(1999) on the basis of the forecasting ability contribution of the model. In our case we 
choose on the basis of the amount of variance in the idiosyncratic component (trying 
to minimise it). Being not particularly interested in forecasting, but the more so in the 
inherent dynamic structure of the data, we investigated if there are advantages by 
using a two sided interval (leads and lags for the extracted common factor). After 
preliminary estimations, a final set up with 1 factor (using the Bai and Ng criteria), no 
lags in data, and 3 leads and lags in the factors have been chosen for the weekly DD 
                                                 
7  Nothing prevents the use of a dynamic principal components approach like the one proposed 
in various papers by Forni, Hallin, Lippi, Reichlin (2000). We resort here to the simpler approach 
proposed by Stock and Watson and quite common in the literature (Angelini-Henry-Mestre 2001, 
Camacho-Sancho 2003). 
 13
changes8. For the monthly changes the Bai and Ng criteria identified two factors and 1 
lead and lag in the factors. 
 
Model’s results 
 
In table 5 we report the average across banks of the variance explained by the three 
components for all countries and a set of selected countries in the two sub-periods 
1995-1998 and 1999-2004. 
 
Our results show that the degree of commonality is quite clearly growing. The EU-
wide and national components altogether go up to 32% since 1999, from 28% in the 
period 1995-1998 in the case of weekly DD changes. Further, the increase in 
commonality is in large part due to the EU-wide component, which rises to 19 % 
since 1999 from 10% before 1999. 
 
Co-movements in bank fragility appear much larger when monthly changes are 
considered. In such a case, in the post 1999-period, the EU-wide component explains 
53% of the variance in monthly DD changes (up from 34% in the before 1999 period). 
Even in this case the increase in the EU-wide component comes at expenses of the 
domestic one (down from 49% to 19%). There is also a significant reduction in the 
share of variance explained by the idiosyncratic component when we move from 
weekly to monthly changes in the DDs. This probably reflects the reduction in noise 
implied in the monthly changes vs. the weekly changes. 
 
Looking at the results by country, we find that all countries share the increase in co-
movements in the two sub-periods. Considering weekly DD changes, the largest 
increase is found in Italy (more than 20%), while in Germany the EU-wide 
component (18% in the post 1999 period) is the smallest (albeit higher than the 
average for the whole sample). Similar findings are obtained with the monthly DD 
changes. 
 
The increase in the weight of the EU-wide component clearly appears from Chart 8, 
which displays the frequency distribution of the variance explained by the EU-wide 
component in the two sub-periods (weekly DD changes). While before 1999 the 
percentage of banks with a variance explained by the EU-wide factor of more than 
30% was only 2%, since 1999 such percentage goes up to about 22%. Moreover, for 
10 banks in our sample more than 50% of the variance in weekly DD changes is 
explained by the EU-wide factor. These are clearly those labelled as large banks (total 
assets higher than EUR 100 bln). Indeed, Table 5 makes it clear that the increase in 
commonality is largely explained by this set of banks: for them the average variance 
explained by the EU-wide common factor goes from 17% of the period 1995-1998 to 
34% in the period 1999-2004. For some of these banks the EU wide common factor 
explains a figure close or even higher than 50% of the variance in weekly DD changes 
(see Table 6). 
 
These results are even more striking when monthly changes are considered. In 
particular, Chart 9 shows that, in the after-1999 period, for 21 banks the share of 
                                                 
8  See the discussion in Stock and Watson (1998) at pagg. 8 and 23. 
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variance explained by the EU-wide component is larger than 75%. A similar finding 
is reported in Table 7 referred to the sample of large banks. 
 
 
4 Sources of co-movements in banks’ fragility: the role of common macro 
shocks 
 
The model 
 
In the previous section we showed that the commonality in the riskness of EU banks 
is clearly increasing and that such rise is largely due to the EU-wide component. It is 
also clear, however, that part of the co-movements in banks’ fragility may stem from 
common macro shocks both at national and EU-wide level. It might be thus 
interesting to make a further step and investigate the role of such macro-shocks in 
explaining the dynamics of our fragility indicator. To this end we resort again to a 
factor model and assume that the DD of each bank can be decomposed into the 
following mutually orthogonal components: 
 
1) a common macroeconomic EU-wide component,  
2) a country-specific macroeconomic component 
3) a residual component. 
 
In other words, with this procedure we clean the dynamics of the DDs from those 
influences that may come from macroeconomic shocks. In this way, and provided that 
the common macro shocks are properly identified, we yield a residual component that 
could be interpreted as a banking system specific source of risk. 
 
Hence, denoting with ijtDD  the Distance-to-Default of bank i incorporated in country 
j, we assume that the changes in the DDs can be decomposed as follows 
 
ij
t
ij
t
ij
t
ij
t emacroNmacroEUDD ++=∆ )(  
 
In turn, similarly as done in the previous section, the residual of the previous equation 
– the banking sector specific source of risk - can be further decomposed into a EU-
wide banking sector, a domestic banking sector and a bank-specific (or idiosyncratic) 
component, i.e. 
 
ij
t
ij
t
ij
t
ij
t INEUe ++=  
 
In order to identify the common macro shocks we took a set of macroeconomic 
variables at country level, available on a monthly frequency, as industrial output (with 
sector breakdown), consumer and producer prices (with product and sector 
breakdown), business and consumer confidence indicators, interest rates, exchange 
rates (nominal and real effective), stock market indexes, etc., for a total of over 700 
series. We then ran a factor model on the complete set of macro variables to extract 
the EU-wide common macro factors. Subsequently, we estimated the common macro 
factors at national level by running the factor model for each country on the residuals 
of the first step. For each bank in the sample we then regressed the monthly DD 
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changes on the EU-wide and national common macro factors (which by definition 
orthogonal). As said, the residuals of these regressions should represent the banking 
sector specific sources of risk. Finally, we applied the sequential procedure used in 
the previous section in order to decompose the banking sector specific source of risk 
into the EU-wide, domestic and a bank-specific (or idiosyncratic) components. 
 
In order to remove the influence of macro shocks from the dynamics of the fragility 
indicator, we tried to include as many as possible macro factors. Once again we used 
the Bai and Ng modified information criteria to choose the number of factors and we 
ended up with 9 and 5 factors at the EU-wide and country level respectively. 
 
Results 
 
The results of this exercise (summarised in Table 8) show that the dynamics of 
monthly DD changes can only in part accounted for by macro factors. They explain 
on average in the entire sample period 34.3% of the dynamics in monthly DD 
changes. The variance explained by EU common macro factors seems to dominate 
over the national one, since on average they account for 25.2% of the total variance in 
banks’ DDs versus 9.1% for domestic macro factors. Taking the two sample periods 
we do observe a larger share of variance explained by the common macro-factors in 
the first part of the sample (41%), whilst in the period 1999-2004 the share of 
variance accounted for by the residuals lifts to 68%. 
 
These results seem then to suggest that common macro shocks are not the sole source 
of bank risks and that the dynamics of EU banks’ fragility is largely accounted for by 
banking system specific factors and that these factors are becoming increasingly 
important. Of course this outcome may also be due to the fact that we were unable to 
correctly identify all macro shocks. However, the finding we obtained does not come 
as a total surprise if one takes into account the fact that in the last three years or so 
there has been an increasing detachment between the results of banks and the 
performance of the EU economy: while the latter has progressively stagnated the 
former have been able to keep their profitability at rather satisfactory levels. 
 
Moving to the decomposition of what we have labelled banking system specific 
component, the results (Table 8) show that the EU-wide part – now at the banking 
sector level – remain still relevant and is increasing in time even once we have 
removed the influence of common macroeconomic shocks. Taking the post-1999 
period the EU-wide component accounts on average for 50% of the variance of 
banking system specific source of fragility (or 34% of the whole dynamics in monthly 
DD changes) up from 35% in the 1994-1998 time interval. Hence in the second part 
of the sample EU-wide banking sector common shocks seem to have become more 
important than common macro shocks in explaining the behaviour of banks’ fragility. 
 
 
5 Conclusions and suggestions for future research 
 
With this paper we aspired at measuring to which extent the fragility of EU banks is 
subject to common shocks. We did this by resorting to a methodology, which has 
recently been extensively applied in the analysis of economic cycles, namely the 
dynamic factor model, which allows to decompose an indicator of bank fragility, the 
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Distance-to-Default, into three main mutually orthogonal components: a EU-wide, a 
country-specific and a bank-level idiosyncratic component. 
 
The results of our model can be summarised as follows. First, the weight of EU wide 
shocks appears not negligible since they explain around 42% of the variance in bank 
risk (as measured by monthly changes in the distance-to-default indicator). The 
relevance of the EU component is also significantly increasing in time, perhaps 
reflecting greater banking integration among EU-banks. Second, as one would 
probably expect, the EU component is much huger for large banks, explaining in a 
number of cases more than 80% of the variance in bank risk. Further, this set of banks 
constitutes the transmission channel of common shocks. Third, even once we take into 
account the influence of common macroeconomic shocks, the dynamics of EU banks’ 
fragility is largely accounted for by banking system specific factors and these factors 
are becoming increasingly important at a EU-wide level. Fourth, by analysing co-
movements in the frequency domain, we found out that common EU-wide shocks are 
more relevant at cyclical and/or long-term frequencies, which is in line with 
increasing banking integration. However, we notice that co-movements at very high 
frequencies (i.e. in the very short term) are relevant for large banks, which might be 
indicative of some form of contagion. 
 
We believe our results have quite important implications as regards the monitoring of 
financial stability conducted by central banks and supervisory authorities in Europe. 
In particular, having found that developments in the fragility of large banks are 
largely affected by common EU-wide shocks constitutes a clear justification for 
macro-prudential surveillance at the EU level, a field which has been recently 
developed by some central banks (like the ECB). 
 
More importantly, our findings provide some indications as to the split of supervisory 
competencies between national and EU-wide authorities. The large weight of the 
idiosyncratic component indicates that banking supervision at domestic level is still 
important. However, its scope should be limited to small-medium sized banks whilst 
for large banks our results suggest, at a minimum, an increased scope for supervisory 
co-operation at EU-wide level. This is further motivated by the growing relevance of 
a banking system specific source of risk at the EU wide level. 
 
The results obtained in the paper lend themselves also to a number of potential 
extensions and applications. Firstly, having found the emergence of common shocks 
stemming from EU banking system specific factors brings to investigate the sources 
of such shocks. This means opening the “black box” and measuring, for instance, to 
which extent developments in EU wide fragility are related to common exposures 
and/or interbank exposures. Secondly, a result of the dynamic factor model is the 
calculation of a EU-wide fragility indicator, which is cleaned from country specific or 
idiosyncratic shocks. In this respect, a potential application consists of conducting 
stress testing exercises of the fragility of EU banks by showing what happens to the 
EU-wide fragility indicator in case of changes in the DD of one bank or a set of 
banks. 
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Tables and charts 
 
Table 1 – List of banks in the sample 
Nr Bank name Country of incorporation
Total assets 
(EUR mln)* Nr Bank name
Country of 
incorporation
1 Bank für Tirol und Vorarlberg AG Austria 5,712 51 Union Financière de France Banque France
2 Bank fuer Kaernten und Steiermark AG - BKS Austria 3,733 52 Alpha Bank AE Greece
3 Investkredit Bank AG Austria 13,479 53 Bank of Attica SA Greece
4 Oberbank AG Austria 9,689 54 Piraeus Bank SA Greece
5 Fortis Bank Belgium 377,728 55 EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA Greece
6 KBC Bank NV Belgium 208,501 56 Egnatia Bank SA Greece
7 Baden - Wuertt. Bank Germany 26,058 57 Emporiki Bank of Greece SA Greece
8 Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG Germany 173,599 58 General Bank of Greece SA Greece
9 Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG Germany 678,340 59 National Bank of Greece SA Greece
10 Commerzbank AG Germany 421,809 60 Allied Irish Banks plc Ireland
11 DePfa Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG Germany 180,899 61 Bank of Ireland Ireland
12 Deutsche Bank AG Germany 758,256 62 Banca Fideuram SpA Italy
13 DVB Bank AG Germany 9,389 63 Banca Intesa SpA Italy
14 Eurohypo AG Germany 225,833 64 Banca Lombarda e Piemontese SpA Italy
15 HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt KGaA Germany 11,049 65 Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA - BNL Italy
16 IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG Germany 36,336 66 Banca Popolare di Intra Italy
17 Vereins-und Westbank AG Germany 21,232 67 Banca Popolare di Lodi Italy
18 Württembergische Hypothekenbank AG Germany 29,253 68 Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL Italy
19 Danske Bank A/S Denmark 235,870 69 Banca popolare dell'Emilia Romagna Italy
20 Fionia Bank Denmark 2,341 70 Banche Popolari Unite - BPU Banca Italy
21 Jyske Bank A/S Denmark 20,633 71 Banco di Sardegna SpA Italy
22 Ringkjobing Bank Denmark 400 72 Capitalia SpA Italy
23 Roskilde Bank Denmark 1,147 73 Credito Bergamasco Italy
24 Spar Nord Bank Denmark 4,269 74 Credito Emiliano SpA Italy
25 Sydbank A/S Denmark 8,990 75 Credito Valtellinese SCarl Italy
26 Vestjysk Bank A/S Denmark 997 76 FinecoGroup SpA Italy
27 Banco Atlantico Spain 9,720 77 Mediobanca SpA Italy
28 Banco de Andalucia Spain 4,978 78 Reti Bancarie Holding SpA Italy
29 Banco de Castilla Spain 2,572 79 San Paolo IMI Italy
30 Banco de Credito Balear Spain 1,134 80 UniCredito Italiano SpA Italy
31 Banco de Galicia Spain 2,272 81 Kredietbank S.A. Luxembourgeoise KBL Luxembourg
32 Banco de Valencia Spain 6,618 82 ABN Amro Holding NV Netherlands
33 Banco de Vasconia Spain 1,860 83 ING Bank NV Netherlands
34 Banco Español de Crédito SA, BANESTO Spain 49,510 84 Kas Bank NV Netherlands
35 Banco Guipuzcoano SA Spain 5,044 85 Banco BPI Portugal
36 Banco Pastor SA Spain 8,870 86 Banco Totta & Açores, SA Portugal
37 Banco Popular Espanol SA Spain 41,899 87 BANIF SGPS SA Portugal
38 Banco Santander Central Hispano Spain 319,030 88 Banco Comercial Português, SA Portugal
39 Bankinter Spain 22,542 89 Banco Espirito Santo SA Portugal
40 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Spain 274,934 90 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB Sweden
41 Alandsbanken Abp - Bank of Aland Ltd. Finland 1,813 91 Svenska Handelsbanken Sweden
42 OKO Bank-OKO Osuuspankkien Keskuspankki Oyj Finland 12,709 92 Abbey National Plc United Kingdom
43 Sampo Plc Finland 25,094 93 Barclays Bank Plc United Kingdom
44 Banque de la Réunion France 1,496 94 HBOS plc United Kingdom
45 BNP Paribas France 710,305 95 HSBC Bank plc United Kingdom
46 Crédit Foncier de France France 43,857 96 Royal Bank of Scotland plc (The) United Kingdom
47 Crédit Agricole d'Ile-de-France France 18,537 97 Schroders Plc United Kingdom
48 Natexis Banques Populaires France 133,400 98 Singer &.Fried. United Kingdom
49 Société Générale France 501,265 99 Standard Chartered Plc United Kingdom
50 Sophia France 3,407  
* as of end 2002 
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Table 2 -Mean correlations in EU banks’ DDs 
 
Total Domestic Cross-border Total Domestic Cross-border
All sample period 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.23 0.12
1995-1998 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.11 0.20 0.10
1999-2004 0.08 0.16 0.07 0.15 0.26 0.14
All sample period 0.17 0.27 0.16 0.35 0.44 0.34
1995-1998 0.10 0.24 0.08 0.21 0.35 0.19
1999-2004 0.24 0.28 0.23 0.42 0.47 0.41
Weekly changes Monthly changes
All banks
Large banks
 
 
 
 
Chart 1. Frequency distribution of domestic pairwise correlations 
(weekly DD changes) 
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Chart 2: Frequency distribution of cross-border pairwise correlations 
(weekly DD changes) 
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Chart 3: Frequency distribution of domestic pairwise correlations 
(monthly DD changes) 
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Chart 4: Frequency distribution of cross-border pairwise correlations 
(monthly DD changes) 
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Table 3 –Number of statistically significant correlations in DD changes at several 
leads and lags*  
Total of which cross-border Total of which cross-border
1 1035 867 100 88
2 714 584 90 86
3 403 353 91 82
4 317 276 84 68
5 382 329 63 58
6 327 277 87 75
7 335 271 88 83
8 316 278 85 77
1 953 761 99 88
2 728 574 73 70
3 362 298 85 77
4 295 251 102 89
5 398 354 75 71
6 358 320 70 63
7 377 326 66 59
8 368 332 74 60
1 1344 1093 57 53
2 743 639 71 66
3 560 491 88 77
1 1384 1131 63 62
2 808 731 59 53
3 583 526 78 63
Lead
Lag
Lag
Positive correlations Negative correlations
Weekly changes
Lead
Monthly changes
 
* Statistically significant correlations are those above and below the threshold 
T
2±  
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Table 4 –Number of economically significant correlations in DD changes at 
several leads and lags* 
Total of which cross-border Total of which cross-border
1 16 12 1 0
2 1 0 0 0
3 2 0 0 0
4 2 1 2 1
5 3 3 0 0
6 0 0 1 1
7 2 1 0 0
8 0 0 1 1
1 15 6 2 1
2 4 2 2 2
3 4 4 2 2
4 0 0 2 1
5 3 3 2 2
6 1 1 0 0
7 0 0 0 0
8 2 2 2 2
1 17 1 0 0
2 2 2 0 0
3 1 1 0 0
1 20 4 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0
Negative correlations
Weekly changes
Lead
Monthly changes
Lead
Lag
Lag
Positive correlations
 
* Economically significant correlations are those above and below the threshold +/- 0.3 +/- 0.5 and for weekly 
and monthly changes respectively 
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Chart 5 –Cross-correlogram in weekly DD changes between Capitalia (Italy) and 
Banco Pastor (Spain)* 
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Chart 6 - Cohesion in weekly DD changes 
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Chart 7 - Cohesion in weekly DD changes 
(sample of 28 large banks) 
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Table 5 - Variance decomposition of DD changes 
(Average variance explained by each extracted component) 
1995-1998 1999-2004 1995-1998 1999-2004
EU-wide 0.102 0.188 0.336 0.526
National 0.180 0.134 0.492 0.191
Idiosyncratic 0.718 0.678 0.172 0.282
EU-wide 0.078 0.288 0.349 0.624
National 0.167 0.074 0.467 0.113
Idiosyncratic 0.755 0.638 0.184 0.263
EU-wide 0.117 0.202 0.333 0.513
National 0.189 0.091 0.527 0.199
Idiosyncratic 0.694 0.707 0.140 0.288
EU-wide 0.079 0.180 0.334 0.524
National 0.191 0.078 0.486 0.158
Idiosyncratic 0.730 0.742 0.180 0.318
EU-wide 0.066 0.216 0.341 0.547
National 0.208 0.099 0.493 0.139
Idiosyncratic 0.726 0.685 0.166 0.315
EU-wide 0.173 0.207 0.337 0.531
National 0.148 0.108 0.507 0.204
Idiosyncratic 0.679 0.685 0.156 0.265
EU-wide 0.167 0.339 0.329 0.687
National 0.200 0.120 0.510 0.114
Idiosyncratic 0.634 0.541 0.161 0.199
Monthlychanges
All countries
Italy
Weekly changes
Large banks
France
UK
Spain
Germany
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Chart 8 – Frequency distribution of the variance explained by the EU 
component (weekly DD changes) 
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Chart 9– Frequency distribution of the variance explained by the EU component 
(monthly DD changes) 
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Table 6 - Variance decomposition of weekly DD changes 
(selected sample of 28 large banks) 
Bank name Country EU-wide National Idiosyncratic EU-wide National Idiosyncratic 
Commerzbank DE 0.173 0.417 0.411 0.623 0.171 0.207
Banco Santander Central Hispano ES 0.185 0.055 0.760 0.582 0.131 0.286
Banca Intesa IT 0.097 0.070 0.833 0.561 0.122 0.317
BBVA ES 0.265 0.051 0.684 0.560 0.118 0.321
BNP Paribas FR 0.081 0.714 0.205 0.550 0.221 0.228
ING NL 0.290 0.061 0.649 0.534 0.072 0.394
Capitalia IT 0.084 0.297 0.619 0.515 0.077 0.408
San Paolo-IMI IT 0.079 0.147 0.774 0.505 0.018 0.478
Societe Generale FR 0.165 0.610 0.224 0.486 0.262 0.252
Fortis Bank BE 0.309 0.091 0.600 0.484 0.281 0.235
Deutsche Bank DE 0.205 0.463 0.333 0.442 0.153 0.405
Barclays UK 0.314 0.112 0.574 0.389 0.094 0.518
UniCredito Italiano IT 0.180 0.141 0.679 0.375 0.046 0.579
ABN Amro Holding NV NL 0.160 0.042 0.798 0.354 0.133 0.512
KBC Bank NV BE 0.261 0.188 0.551 0.348 0.361 0.291
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SE 0.178 0.036 0.786 0.308 0.078 0.614
Royal Bank of Scotland UK 0.157 0.307 0.535 0.290 0.105 0.605
Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG DE 0.162 0.327 0.510 0.275 0.194 0.531
HBOS - MARKET VALUE UK 0.153 0.177 0.669 0.243 0.279 0.478
Natexis Banques Populaires FR 0.063 0.099 0.838 0.227 0.046 0.726
HSBC Holdings Plc UK 0.279 0.106 0.615 0.160 0.048 0.792
Abbey National Plc UK 0.185 0.195 0.620 0.149 0.173 0.678
Standard Chartered Plc UK 0.078 0.177 0.745 0.138 0.033 0.829
Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG DE 0.081 0.051 0.868 0.127 0.054 0.818
Svenska Handelsbanken SE 0.213 0.030 0.757 0.102 0.035 0.863
Danske Bank A/S DK 0.162 0.344 0.493 0.093 0.004 0.903
DePfa Deutsche Pfandbrief Bank AG DE 0.084 0.262 0.655 0.047 0.052 0.901
Eurohypo AG DE 0.021 0.019 0.960 0.011 0.003 0.986
1995-1998 1999-2004
 
 
Table 7: Variance decomposition of monthly DD changes 
(selected sample of 28 large banks) 
Bank name Country EU-wide National Idiosyncratic EU-wide National Idiosyncratic 
Fortis Bank BE 0.348 0.561 0.092 0.876 0.043 0.080
Banco Santander Central Hispano ES 0.346 0.577 0.078 0.852 0.027 0.121
Commerzbank DE 0.350 0.583 0.067 0.848 0.031 0.121
San Paolo-IMI IT 0.260 0.413 0.327 0.842 0.036 0.122
Banca Intesa IT 0.379 0.421 0.200 0.841 0.051 0.108
Deutsche Bank DE 0.350 0.595 0.054 0.833 0.049 0.118
BBVA ES 0.327 0.549 0.125 0.811 0.050 0.139
ING NL 0.336 0.423 0.241 0.795 0.019 0.186
UniCredito Italiano IT 0.329 0.564 0.107 0.793 0.039 0.168
BNP Paribas FR 0.352 0.568 0.081 0.788 0.088 0.125
ABN Amro Holding NV NL 0.306 0.479 0.215 0.787 0.048 0.165
Capitalia IT 0.361 0.461 0.179 0.783 0.087 0.129
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SE 0.307 0.372 0.321 0.783 0.027 0.191
KBC Bank NV BE 0.345 0.579 0.077 0.777 0.123 0.100
Barclays UK 0.296 0.513 0.191 0.763 0.071 0.166
Societe Generale FR 0.352 0.596 0.052 0.763 0.091 0.146
Royal Bank of Scotland UK 0.327 0.586 0.088 0.694 0.117 0.189
Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG DE 0.293 0.434 0.273 0.686 0.139 0.176
Svenska Handelsbanken SE 0.285 0.464 0.252 0.675 0.108 0.217
Abbey National Plc UK 0.339 0.545 0.116 0.609 0.146 0.245
Natexis Banques Populaires FR 0.391 0.483 0.127 0.550 0.141 0.309
Standard Chartered Plc UK 0.313 0.581 0.106 0.530 0.231 0.239
HBOS - MARKET VALUE UK 0.337 0.553 0.110 0.493 0.281 0.226
Danske Bank A/S DK 0.345 0.572 0.084 0.458 0.133 0.408
DePfa Deutsche Pfandbrief Bank AG DE 0.346 0.588 0.066 0.456 0.167 0.377
Eurohypo AG DE 0.268 0.175 0.557 0.448 0.201 0.351
Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG DE 0.290 0.504 0.206 0.371 0.383 0.246
HSBC Holdings Plc UK 0.332 0.541 0.127 0.337 0.251 0.412
1995-1998 1999-2004
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Table 8 - Variance decomposition of monthly DD changes 
1995-98 1999-04
EU macro factors 0.30 0.24
Domestic macro factors 0.11 0.08
Banking sector specific factors 0.59 0.68
- EU wide 0.20 0.34
- Domestic 0.29 0.14
- Bank specific (idiosyncratic) 0.09 0.20
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